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Abstract
In this paper we compare the semantical and syntactical deﬁnitions of extensions for open default theories. We prove that, over
monadic languages, these deﬁnitions are equivalent and do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying inﬁnite world. We also
show that, under the domain closure assumption, one free variable open default theories are decidable.
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1. Introduction
Non-monotonic logics are intended to simulate the process of human reasoning by providing a formalism for deriving
consistent conclusions from an incomplete description of the world.
Reiter’s default logic [13] is one of the widely used non-monotonic formalisms and may be the only non-monotonic
formalism that has a clearly useful contribution to the wider ﬁeld of computer science through logic programming and
database theory. This logic deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of the form
(x) = (x) : M1(x), . . . ,Mm(x)
(x)
, (1)
where (x), 1(x), . . . , m(x), m1, and (x) are formulas of ﬁrst-order logic whose free variables are among x =
x1, . . . , xn. A default is closed if none of , 1, . . . , m, and  contains a free variable. Otherwise it is open. Roughly
speaking, the intuitive meaning of a default is as follows. For every n-tuple of objects t = t1, . . . , tn, if (t) is believed,
and the i (t)s are consistent with one’s beliefs, then one is permitted to deduce (t) and add it to the “belief set.” Thus,
an open default can be thought of as a kind of “default scheme,” where free variables x can be replaced by any of the
theory’s objects. Various examples of deduction by defaults can be found in [13].
Whereas closed defaults have been quite thoroughly investigated, very little is known about open ones. However,
interesting cases of default reasoning usually dealwith open defaults, because the intended use of defaults is to determine
whether an object possesses a given property, rather than accepting or rejecting a “ﬁxed statement.’’
It was pointed out in [8] that when applying open defaults one must specify all the objects of the underlying theory.
Also, it was argued in [4] that one must distinguish between objects deﬁned explicitly (closed terms) and objects
introduced implicitly (by existential formulas, say).
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In this paper we use the semantical deﬁnition of extensions for open default theories proposed in [8,4], where, in
contrast to the syntactical deﬁnitions in [12,13], the default-free variables are treated as object variables, rather than
meta-variables for the closed terms of the theory. The reason for choosing a semantical deﬁnition of extensions is that,
on the one hand, it provides a complete description of the theory objects, while distinguishing between explicitly and
implicitly deﬁned ones, on the other.
Since the semantical treatment of open default theories allows one to describe all the elements of the domain
under consideration, it has no syntactical counterpart within the ordinary ﬁrst-order default logic, unless the domain is
explicitly deﬁned by the domain closure assumption, i.e., the axiom
∀x
m∨
i=1
x = ti , (2)
where t1, . . . , tm are closed terms. Under the domain closure assumption, extensions can be described syntactically by
extending the underlying language of default theory with an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols and replacing each
open default with the set of all its closed instances.
It was shown in [7] that extensions for open default theories depend on the domain cardinality (cf. [5]) and that over
countable 1 or ﬁnite domains, extensions for open default theories can be described syntactically in ﬁrst-order logic
extended with an inﬁnitary Carnap rule of inference
{(t)}t∈TL
∀x(x) , (3)
denoted by C. Here and hereafter TL denotes the set of all closed terms of a language L. 2
In this paper we show that, when the underlying language of default theory is monadic, the semantical deﬁnition
and the above syntactical description of extensions for open default theories are equivalent and do not depend on the
cardinality of the underlying inﬁnite domain. That is, extensions for open default theories over monadic languages can
be (equivalently) described syntactically in ﬁrst-order logic extended with the Carnap rule of inference. Like in the case
of explicitly deﬁned ﬁnite domains, the syntactical deﬁnition treats an open default as the set of all its closed instances
over the underlying language of default theory, extended with an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols. We prove then,
that in this syntactical deﬁnition, it is sufﬁcient to extend the underlying language with a countable set of new constant
symbols. As a corollary we obtain that the original semantical deﬁnition of extension for open default theories over
monadic languages can always be restricted to a countable base.
It should be pointed out that, even though monadic languages are rather restrictive, many (if not most) examples and
case studies of open default deal with monadic languages.
In addition, we show that, under the domain closure assumption (2), for uniterm default theories introduced in [1],
we may restrict ourselves to a computable ﬁnite base. Therefore, uniterm default theories are decidable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the notation and some basic results used throughout
this paper, and in Section 3 we show that extensions for default theories over monadic languages do not depend on
the cardinality of the underlying inﬁnite domain. In Section 4 we show that under the domain closure assumption,
extensions for uniterm default theories do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying domain and, therefore, we
may restrict ourselves to an explicitly deﬁned ﬁnite domain. Finally, Section 5 contains the proofs of some of the
statements from Sections 2–4.
2. Background
In this section we brieﬂy recall the deﬁnitions of default theories and the Herbrand semantics of ﬁrst-order logic. In
what follows we assume that language L of the underlying ﬁrst-order logic is countable.
2.1. Default theories
Reiter’s default logic [13] deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of the form (1).
1 In this paper, “countable” means inﬁnite countable.
2 Obviously, the domain closure assumption (2) implies C (3), and, if TL is ﬁnite, then the converse implication also holds.
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A default theory is a pair (D,A), where D is a set of defaults and A is a set of ﬁrst-order sentences (axioms). A
default theory is closed, if all its defaults are closed. However, in general, default theories are referred to as open. 3
2.2. Extensions for closed default theories
Here, we present the syntactical and semantical deﬁnitions of extensions for closed default theories.
Recall that closed defaults are expressions of the form
 : M1, . . . ,Mm

,
where , 1, . . . , m, m1, and  are closed formulas.
Deﬁnition 1 (Reiter [13, Deﬁnition 1]). Let (D,A) be a closed default theory. For any set of sentences S let(D,A)(S)
be the smallest set of sentences B (beliefs) that satisﬁes the following three properties.
D1. A ⊆ B.
D2. Th(B) = B, i.e., B is deductively closed.
D3. If ( : M1, . . . ,Mm)/ ∈ D,  ∈ B, and ¬1, . . . ,¬m ∈ S, then  ∈ B.
A set of sentences E is an extension for (D,A) if (D,A)(E) = E, i.e., if E is a ﬁxed point of the operator (D,A).
Next, we present a semantical deﬁnition of extension for closed default theories. Here and hereafter, for any class of
interpretations W, by ThL(W) we mean the set of all closed formulas over L satisﬁed by all elements of W.
Deﬁnition 2 (Guerreiro and Casanova [3]). Let (D,A) be a closed default theory over L. For any class of interpreta-
tions W, let (D,A)(W) be the largest class V of models of A that satisﬁes the following condition.
If ( : M1, . . . ,Mm)/ ∈ D,  ∈ ThL(V ), and ¬1, . . . ,¬m ∈ ThL(W), then  ∈ ThL(V ).
Theorem 1 states that the deﬁnition of extensions as the theories of the ﬁxed points of the operator  is equivalent
to Reiter’s original deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 1).
Theorem 1 (Guerreiro and Casanova [3], see also [10, Theorem 3.45, p. 65]). A set of sentences E is an extension
for a closed default theory (D,A) if and only if E = ThL(W) for some ﬁxed point W of (D,A).
2.3. Herbrand semantics of ﬁrst-order logic
In this section we deﬁne Herbrand semantics of ﬁrst-order logic that is the basis of the semantical approach to open
default theories.
Let b be a set that contains no symbols of the underlying language L. We denote by Lb the language obtained
from L by augmenting its set of constants with all elements of b. 4 The set of all closed terms of the language Lb is
called the Herbrand universe of Lb. A Herbrand b-interpretation is a set of ground (closed) atomic formulas of Lb.
Note that closed formulas over Lb are of the form (t1, . . . , tn), where t1, . . . , tn are closed terms of language Lb and
(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula over L whose free variables are among x1, . . . , xn. The set b is called the base of Herbrand
b-interpretation.
Letw be a Herbrand b-interpretation and let be a closed formula overLb.We say thatw satisﬁes, denotedw ,
if the following holds.
• If  is an atomic formula, then w  if and only if  ∈ w;
• w  ⊃  if and only if w   or w ;
• w ¬ if and only if w  ; and
• w ∀x(x) if and only if for each t ∈ TLb , w (t).
3 That is, a closed default theory is a particular case of an open one.
4 Note that if b is uncountable, then so is Lb .
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For a Herbrand b-interpretation w we deﬁne the L-theory (Lb-theory) of w, denoted ThL(w) (ThLb (w)), as the
set of all closed formulas of L (Lb) satisﬁed by w. For a set of Herbrand b-interpretations W we deﬁne the L-theory
(Lb-theory) of W, denoted ThL(W) (ThLb (W)), as the set of all closed formulas of L (Lb) satisﬁed by all elements of
W. That is, ThL(W) =
⋂
w∈W ThL(w) (ThLb (W) =
⋂
w∈W ThLb (w)). Finally, let X be a set of closed formulas over
Lb. We say that w is a Herbrand b-model of X, denoted by w X, if X ⊆ ThLb (w).
Remark 1. It is well-known that for an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols b, Herbrand b-interpretations are complete
and sound for ﬁrst-order logic. That is, for a set of formulas X over L and a formula  over L, X  if and only if 
is satisﬁed by all Herbrand b-interpretations which satisfy X. In particular, Herbrand b-interpretations with an inﬁnite
base naturally arise in the Henkin proof of the completeness theorem [11, Lemma 2.16, p. 89].
2.4. Extensions for open default theories
In this section, departing from Deﬁnition 2 and following [8,4] we present a deﬁnition of extensions for open default
theories. It is known from [4] (see also Remark 2 below) that for closed default theories this deﬁnition is equivalent to
the original Reiter’s deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 1).
We start with the intuition underlying the deﬁnition. There are two types of objects in the domain of a default theory.
One type consists of the ﬁxed built-in objects which belong to TL and must be present in any Herbrand interpretation,
and the other type consist of implicitly deﬁned unknown objects which may vary from one Herbrand interpretation to
other, e.g., objects introduced by existentially quantiﬁed formulas. These objects generate other unknown objects by
means of the function symbols of L. Thus, it seems natural to assume that the theory domain is a Herbrand universe of
the original language augmented with a set of new (unknown) objects, cf. [9, Chapter 1, Section 3].
The following deﬁnition of extensions for open default theories is a relativization of Deﬁnition 2 to Herbrand
b-interpretations with an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols b. The reason for passing to a semantical deﬁnition is
that, in general, it is impossible to describe a Herbrand universe by means of the standard proof theory. The only
exception is the cases when the theory domain is explicitly ﬁnite (see [6]), i.e., contains axiom (2).
Deﬁnition 3 (Cf. Kaminski [4, Deﬁnition 27]). Let b be a set of new constant symbols and let (D,A) be a default
theory. For any set of Herbrand b-interpretations W let 	b(D,A)(W) be the largest set V of Herbrand b-models of A that
satisﬁes the following condition.
For any default ((x) : M1(x), . . . ,Mm(x))/(x) ∈ D and any tuple t of elements of TLb if (t) ∈ ThLb (V ) and¬1(t), . . . ,¬m(t) ∈ ThLb (W), then (t) ∈ ThLb (V ).
A set of sentences E is called a b-extension for (D,A) if E = ThL(W) for some ﬁxed point W of 	b(D,A).
We will also refer to the set b as the base of E.
Remark 2. It follows from the Löwnheim–Skolem theorem that, for a closed default theory (D,A) and an inﬁnite
base b, a set of sentences is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if it is an “ordinary” Reiter’s extension for (D,A).
From now on, unless we state otherwise, we deal with inﬁnite bases, because the cardinality of a ﬁnite base b can be
extracted from the b-extension, which is undesirable in the general case.
Remark 3. Note that for two bases b and b′ of different cardinality the sets of b- and b′-extensions for an open default
theory do not necessarily coincide, see [7, Example 7.1].
2.5. Syntactical description of extensions for open default theories
This section contains a syntactical deﬁnition of extensions for open default theories. The basic idea of the syntactical
deﬁnition is, roughly speaking, as follows. Following [12], we treat an open default as the set of all its closed instances
over language Lb that is the original language L extended with the base b of Hb.
Whereas over explicitly deﬁned ﬁnite domains, “completeness” of the set of all closed instances of a set of defaults
follows from the domain closure assumption (2), completeness in the case of inﬁnite domains is a more delicate issue.
The inﬁnite domain counterpart of the domain closure assumption is the Carnap rule of inference C (3).
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Deﬁnition 4 below is a relativization of Deﬁnition 1 to ﬁrst-order logic extended with C. We shall need one more bit
of notation.
For a set of formulas X we denote by ThC(X) the set of all formulas derivable from X in ﬁrst-order logic extended
with C. We say that a set of formulas X is C-consistent if ThC(X) is consistent in the usual ﬁrst-order sense.
Deﬁnition 4 (Kaminski et al. [7, Deﬁnition 6.5]). Let (D,A) be a closed default theory. For any set of sentences S let
C(D,A)(S) be the smallest set of sentences B (beliefs) that satisﬁes the following three properties.
CD1. A ⊆ B.
CD2. ThC(B) = B, i.e., B is “C-deductively” closed.
CD3. If ( : M1, . . . ,Mm)/ ∈ D,  ∈ B, and ¬1, . . . ,¬m ∈ S, then  ∈ B.
A set of sentences E is a C-extension for (D,A) if C(D,A)(E) = E, i.e., if E is a ﬁxed point of the operator C(D,A).
To deﬁne C-extensions for open default theories we need the formal deﬁnition of a closed instance of an open default.
Deﬁnition 5 (Kaminski et al. [7, Deﬁnition 6.4]). A closed instance (t) of an open default (x)=((x) : M1(x), . . . ,
Mm(x))/(x) is default ((t) : M1(t), . . . ,Mm(t))/(t), where t = t1, . . . , tn is a tuple of closed terms of
the underlying language. For a set of defaults D we denote by D¯L the set of all closed instances (over L) of all defaults
of D.
Theorem 2 shows that, in contrast with Remark 3, restrictions of C-extensions for (D¯Lb , A) to L do not depend on
the cardinality of the (inﬁnite) base b. This theorem and its corollary are our new results, but they naturally belong to
this section of the background. Theorem 2 is used for the proofs of the results stated in Section 3.
Theorem 2 (Cf. Remark 3). Let (D,A) be an open default theory and let b and b′ be inﬁnite sets of new constant
symbols. Then for any C-extension E for (D¯Lb , A) there is a C-extension E′ for (D¯Lb′ , A) such that E ∩ FmL =
E′ ∩ FmL. 5
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 5.1.
Corollary 1. Let (D,A) be a closed default theory and let b be an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols. Then a
set of Lb-formulas E is a C-extension for (D¯Lb , A) if and only if there is an extension E′ for (D,A), such that E′= E ∩ FmL.
Proof. By Theorem 2, we may assume that b is countable. Then, by [7, Theorem 6.6] (see also Theorem 4 in the next
section), E is a C-extension for (D¯Lb , A) if and only if there is a ﬁxed pointW of 	b(D,A) such that E = ThLb (W), and
the corollary follows from Remark 2. 
2.6. Extensions over countable bases
This section deals with extensions over a countable base b. We start with the completeness theorem for ﬁrst-order
logic with the Carnap rule over countable languages. We shall use the following terminology.
When the language Lb is ﬁxed or understood from the context, Herbrand b-interpretations (models) will be referred
to as term interpretations (models).
Obviously, term interpretations are sound for the Carnap rule. Theorem 3 shows that if the underlying language is
countable, then term interpretations are also complete.
Theorem 3 (Kaminski et al. [7, Theorem 6.3]). Let b be a ﬁnite or countable set of new constant symbols. Then each
C-consistent set of formulas over Lb has a term model.
5 We denote by FmL the set of all closed formulas (sentences) over L.
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Remark 4. It is well-known that there are C-consistent sets of formulas over an uncountable language which do not
have a termmodel, e.g., see [7, Example 6.7]. In particular, the language in this example isLb, where b is an uncountable
set of new constant symbols. 6
Now, using Theorem 3, we can show that, for countable bases, semantical and syntactical deﬁnitions of extensions
are equivalent.
Theorem 4 (Kaminski et al. [7, Theorem 6.6]). Let (D,A) be an open default theory and let b be a countable set of
new constant symbols. Then E is a C-extension for (D¯Lb , A) if and only if there is a ﬁxed point W of 	b(D,A) such that
E = ThLb (W).
Corollary 2 (Kaminski et al. [7, Corollary to Theorem 6.6]). Let (D,A) be an open default theory and let b be a
countable set of new constant symbols. Then E is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if there is a C-extension E′ for
(D¯Lb , A) such that E = E′ ∩ FmL.
Remark 5. Note that the above corollary does not hold in the general case, see [7, Example 6.9]. Thus, as it was
pointed out in [7], in order to deﬁne syntactically extensions over uncountable domains, we have, in addition to the
Carnap rule, to use inﬁnitary languages which allow to express set-theoretic rules of inference. It seems that inﬁnitary
logic is a too high price for a syntactical equivalent of the domain closure assumption.
3. Default theories over monadic languages
This section deals with the main subject of our paper—open default theories over monadic languages. We show that,
for monadic languages, the semantical and the syntactical deﬁnitions of extensions are equivalent and do not depend
on the cardinality of the (inﬁnite) base b.
We start with the completeness theorem for ﬁrst-order logic with the Carnap rule over monadic languages.
Theorem 5 (Cf. Theorem 3 and Remark 4). Let L be a monadic language and let b be an inﬁnite set of new constant
symbols. Then each C-consistent set of formulas over Lb has a term model.
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Section 5.2.
Note that in Theorem 5, Lb has countably many predicate symbols, whereas the set of its constant symbols may be
uncountable. The example shows that Theorem 5 does not extend onto the languages whose set of predicate symbols
is uncountable.
Example (Cf. [7, Example 6.7]). Let I and J be an uncountable and a countable sets of indices, respectively, and let
the underlying language consist of unary predicates {Pi}i∈I and constant symbols {aj }j∈J .
Let the set of proper axioms X consist of formulas
• ∃xPi(x) for each i ∈ I and
• ¬∃x(Pi′(x) ∧ Pi′′(x)) for each i′, i′′ ∈ I such that i′ = i′′.
Like in the proof of [7, Proposition 6.8] one can show that X is C-consistent. However, X does not have a term model,
because each its term model induces an injection from an uncountable I into a countable J.
For what follows we need to restate Theorem 5 in an equivalent form given by Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. Let L be a monadic language, b be an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols, and let X be a C-deductively
closed set of closed formulas over Lb. Then X = ThLb (V ), where V is the set of all term models of X.
Now, using Theorem 6, similar to the proof of [10, Theorem 3.45, p. 65], one can show that the set of C-extensions
for (D¯Lb , A) coincide with the theories of ﬁxed points of 	b(D,A) (cf. Theorem 1), which, in turn, implies the following
theorem.
6 Recall that L itself is a countable language.
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Theorem 7 (Cf. the corollary to Theorem 4). Let L be a monadic language, (D,A) be an open default theory over L,
and let b be a set of new constant symbols. Then E is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if there is a C-extension E′
for (D¯Lb , A) such that E = E′ ∩ FmL.
Finally, Theorem 8, that states that for monadic languages b-extensions do not depend on the cardinality of an inﬁnite
base b, is an immediate consequence of Theorems 2 and 7.
Theorem 8. Let L be a monadic language, (D,A) be an open default theory over L, and let b and b′ be inﬁnite sets
of new constant symbols. Then E is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if it is a b′-extension for (D,A).
In particular, it follows from Theorem 8 that when dealing with open default theories over monadic languages we
may restrict ourselves to a countable base b, which is not true in the general case (see Remark 3).
4. Uniterm default theories
This section deals with uniterm default theories introduced in [1] (see also Deﬁnition 6). We show that under the
domain closure assumption (2), when dealing with uniterm default theories, we may restrict ourselves to ﬁnite bases.
In the general case, it is known from [6] that under the domain closure assumption b-extensions for an open default
theory (D,A) coincide with the restrictions of extensions of (D¯Lb , A) to L, see Theorem 9.
Theorem 9 (Kaminski [6, Lemma 6.2]). Let (D,A) be an open default theory such that for some constants a1, . . . , am,
A∀x∨mi=1 x = ai , 7 and let b be an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols. Then E is an extension for (D¯Lb , A) if and
only if there is a ﬁxed point W of 	b(D,A) such that E = ThLb (W).
Remark 6. Example 5.1 in [6] shows that, for an open default theory (D,A), the domain closure assumption does
not imply that extensions for (D¯L, A) coincide with b-extensions for (D,A). Nevertheless, the implication holds for
normal default theories, see [6, Theorem 5.6], and, in the general case, it holds in the presence of the unique name
assumption : Mx = y/x = y, see [6, Theorem 5.4].
Next we recall the deﬁnition of uniterm default theories from [1]. Deﬁnition 6 is a particular case of [1,
Deﬁnition 10].
Deﬁnition 6 (Cf. Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary et al. [1, Deﬁnitions 6 and 10]). Let L be a ﬁnite monadic language. A propo-
sitional (boolean) combination of atomic formulas over the same variable x is called a uniterm formula over x.A default
theory (D,A) is called uniterm if for every default  ∈ D, all formulas which appear in  are uniterm formulas over
the same variable.
The main result of this section is that for a uniterm default theory (D,A) the restrictions of extensions for (D¯Lb , A)
toL do not depend on the cardinality of base b (Theorem 10). Thus, under the domain closure assumption, b-extensions
for uniterm default theories do not depend on the cardinality of b either.
Theorem 10. Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory. There exists a ﬁnite set of new constant symbols b′ such that for
any inﬁnite set of new constant symbols b the following holds. There is an extension E for (D¯Lb , A) if and only if there
is an extension E′ for (D¯Lb′ , A) such that E ∩ FmL = E′ ∩ FmL.
The proof of Theorem 10 is presented in Section 5.3.
Now it follows from Theorems 9 and 10 that, under the domain closure assumption, when dealing with uniterm
default theories we may restrict ourselves to ﬁnite bases.
7 Cf. (2).
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Theorem 11. Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory, such that for some constants a1, . . . , am, A ∀x∨mi=1 x = ai . 8
There exists a ﬁnite set of new constant symbols b′ such that for each inﬁnite set of new constant symbols b the following
holds. A set of formulas is a b-extension for (D,A) if and only if it is a b′-extension for (D,A).
An immediate proof of Theorem 10 follows in Section 5.3 that, under the domain closure assumption, extensions
for uniterm default theories are computable.
5. Proofs
Here, we present the proofs of Theorem 2 (Section 5.1), Theorem 5 (Section 5.2), and Theorem 10 (Section 5.3).
5.1. Proof of Theorem 2
In this sectionwe prove that the intersections of C-extensions for (D¯Lb , A)with FmL do not depend on the cardinality
of the inﬁnite base b. Namely, we show that we may restrict ourself to a countable set b of new constant symbols.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of [5, Theorem 7]. In the next section we deﬁne the so-called C,R-proof
systems and in Section 5.1.2 we prove the major auxiliary lemmas and the theorem itself.
5.1.1. C,R-proof systems
In this section we introduce the notion of the C,R-proof system. First-order logic extended with C is deﬁned as the
C,∅-proof system.
Deﬁnition 7 (Cf. Marek and Truszczyn´ski [10, Deﬁnition 3.24, p. 54]). Let R be a set of expressions of the form /,
where  and  are closed formulas. The R-rule is the rule of inference of the form /, where / ∈ R.
Deﬁnition 8. Let X be a set of closed formulas over Lb and R ⊆ {/ : , ∈ FmLb }. A C,R-derivation in Lb from
X is a (well-ordered) sequence 1,2, . . . ,, . . . of closed formulas over Lb such that for every , at least one of the
following conditions holds.
•  is an axiom of Lb.
•  ∈ X.
• There exists 1, 2 < , such that 1 is of the form 2 ⊃  ( is obtained by modus ponens).• There exists  < , such that / ∈ R ( is obtained by the R-rule).
•  is of the form ∀x(x) and for each term t ∈ TLb , there exists t < , such that t is (t) ( is obtained
by C).
We say that a formula  is C,R-derivable from X, denoted X C,R  , if there exists a C,R-derivation from X that
contains .
We denote by ThC,R(X) the set of all closed formulas C,R-derivable from X, i.e., ThC,R(X) = { : X C,R }, and
we write ThC(X) for ThC,∅(X). That is, ThC(X) is the set of formulas derivable from X in ﬁrst-order logic extended
with C.
Remark 7. The reason for dealing with derivations from sets of closed formulas only is that, because of C, we
may restrict ourselves to the closed instances of the ﬁrst-order axioms. In particular, Generalization (x)/∀x(x) is
redundant in C,R-derivations.
Deﬁnition 9. Let b′ ⊆ b, R ⊆ {/ : , ∈ FmLb }, and let X′ and X be sets of formulas over FmLb′ and FmLb ,
respectively. We say that X is a C,R-conservative extension of X′ if ThC,R(X)∩FmLb′ = ThC,R|Lb′ (X′), where R|Lb′
denotes the restriction of R to Lb′ . That is, R|Lb′ = {/ ∈ R : , ∈ FmLb′ }. 9
8 Of course, binary predicate symbol = does not belong to a (ﬁnite) monadic language L. Nevertheless, equality is deﬁnable in L, see [11,
Exercise 2.76, p. 102].
9 Note that, whereas in the classical case, trivially, Th(X′) ⊆ Th(X), the inclusion ThC,R|Lb′ (X′) ⊆ ThC,R(X) does not necessarily hold,
because of C.
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Lemma 1. Let b be an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols, R ⊆ {/ : , ∈ FmLb }, and let X be a set of closed
formulas over Lb. There exists a countable subset b′ of b, such that X is a C,R-conservative extension of X ∩ FmLb′ .
Proof. For the proof we ﬁx a C,R-derivation from X containing all elements of ThC,R(X), that will be referred to as
the canonical derivation.
Also, we shall use the following notation. For a formula  over Lb we denote by b the set of all elements of b
which appear in , 10 and for a set of formulas S over Lb we denote by bS the set of all elements of b which appear in
the formulas of S. That is, bS = ⋃∈S b. Similarly, for a term t over Lb we denote by bt the set of all elements of b
which appear in t.
Now, for each formula  ∈ FmLb we deﬁne a subset [] of b as described below. The deﬁnition depends on the
cases of X C,R  and X  C,R .
Assume X C,R .
• If  is an axiom, an element of X, or is derived (in the canonical derivation) by C, then [] = b.
• If  is derived (in the canonical derivation) by modus ponens from  and  ⊃ , or is derived from  by R-rule
/, then [] = b ∪ b.
Assume X  C,R .
• If  is of the form ∀x(x), then for some term t ∈ TLb , X  C,R (t), and [] = bt . 11• If  is not of the form ∀x(x), then [] = ∅.
Next we construct a sequence b0, b1, . . . of subsets of b by the following induction: b0 = ∅ and bi+1 = bFmLbi .
Finally, we let b′ be
⋃∞
i=0bi .
It immediately follows from the deﬁnition that [] is ﬁnite. Therefore, each bi is countable and b′ is countable as
well.
We contend that X is a C,R-conservative extension of X ∩ FmLb′ . That is, for any closed formula  over Lb′ ,
X ∩ FmLb′C,R′  if and only if X C,R , where R′ = R|Lb′ .
For the “only if” part, assume thatX∩FmLb′C,R′ .We shall show by induction on the length of the C,R′-derivation
of  from X ∩ FmLb′ that X C,R .
The induction basis, i.e., the case in which  is an axiom or belongs to X ∩ FmLb′ is straightforward.
For the induction step, the cases in which  is obtained by modus ponens or an R-rule immediately follow from the
induction hypothesis.
Assume that  is of the form ∀x(x) and is obtained from {(t)}t∈TL
b′
by C. That is, X ∩ FmLb′ C,R′ (t) for
each t ∈ TLb′ . Also, since for each t ∈ TLb′ , a C,R′-derivation of (t) appears in the derivation of , by the induction
hypothesis,
X C,R (t). (4)
Now, assume to the contrary that X  C,R ∀x(x). Since ∀x(x) ∈ FmLb′ , for some j = 0, 1, . . ., ∀x(x) ∈ FmLbj ,
and, by the deﬁnition of bj+1, for some t ∈ bj+1 (⊆ b′), X  C,R (t), in contradiction with (4).
For the “if” part of the lemma, let X C,R . We shall prove by induction on the length of that proof that X ∩
FmLb′ C,R′ .
Like in the proof of the “only if” part of the lemma, the induction basis is immediate. The cases of modus ponens
and R-rules are trivial 12 and we shall consider the case of C only.
Assume that  is of the form ∀x(x) and is obtained from {(t)}t∈TLb by C. That is, X C,R (t) for each t ∈ TLb .
In particular, X C,R (t) for each t ∈ TLb′ . Since ∀x(x) is a formula over Lb′ , (t) is also a formula over Lb′
for each t ∈ TLb′ . Moreover, (t) appears in the canonical derivation prior to . Thus, the induction hypothesis,
X ∩ FmLb′ C,R′ (t) for each t ∈ TLb′ , and, by C, X ∩ FmLb′C,R′. 
5.1.2. Countable bases and the proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on Lemmas 2 and 3.
10 For example, if  ∈ FmL, then b = ∅.
11 Here, we pick up the ﬁrst term t for which X  C,R(t) according to some ﬁxed order.
12 Recall that we deal with the canonical derivation ﬁxed in the beginning of the proof.
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Lemma 2 (Cf. Marek and Truszczyn´ski [10, Theorem 3.25, p. 55]). Let (D,A) be an open default theory over L, b be
an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols, S be a set of closed formulas over Lb, and let
R =
{


:  : M1, . . . ,Mm

∈ D¯Lb and ¬1, . . . ,¬m ∈ S
}
.
Then C
(D¯Lb ,A)
(S) = ThC,R(A).
The proof of the lemma immediately follows from the deﬁnitions and is omitted.
Lemma 3. Let (D,A) be an open default theory, b be an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols and let E be a C-extension
for (D¯Lb , A). There exists a countable subset b′ of b and a C-extension E′ for (D¯Lb′ , A) such that E ∩ FmL =
E′ ∩ FmL.
Proof. Let
R =
{


:  : M1, . . . ,Mm

∈ D¯Lb and ¬1, . . . ,¬m ∈ E
}
.
By Lemma 1, there exists a countable subset b′ of b, such that ThC,R(A) ∩ FmLb′ = ThC,R
′
(A), where R′ = R|Lb′ .
We contend that E′ = E ∩ FmLb′ is a C-extension for (D¯Lb′ , A), i.e., E′ = C(D¯L
b′ ,A)
(E′).
Since E is a C-extension for (D¯Lb , A), E = C(D¯Lb ,A)(E). By Lemma 2 (with S = E
′), C
(D¯Lb ,A)
(E) = ThC,R(A),
implying C
(D¯Lb ,A)
(E) ∩ FmLb′ = ThC,R(A) ∩ FmLb′ , and, by the choice of b′, ThC,R(A) ∩ FmLb′ = ThC,R
′
(A).
Therefore,
E′ = E ∩ FmLb′ = (C(D¯Lb ,A)(E)) ∩ FmLb′ = Th
C,R(A) ∩ FmLb′ = ThC,R
′
(A).
Now, by Lemma 2 (with S = E and b = b′), C
(D¯L
b′ ,A)
(E′) = ThC,R′′(A) where
R′′ =
{


:  : M1, . . . ,Mm

∈ D¯Lb′ and ¬1, . . . ,¬m ∈ E′
}
.
Since R′ = R|Lb′ and E′ = E ∩ FmLb′ , we have R′ = R′′. Therefore,
E′ = ThC,R′(A) = ThC,R′′(A) = C
(D¯L
b′ ,A)
(E′),
which completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now Theorem 2 immediately follows from Lemma 3. Indeed, we may assume that b′ is countable and, since the
elements of b′ do not belong to L, renaming them, if necessary, we may assume that b′ is the set of constants from
Lemma 3. Therefore, E ∩ FmL = E′ ∩ FmL.
5.2. Proof of Theorem 5
In this section we prove that each C-consistent set of formulas over Lb has a term model. The proof is similar to
the Henkin proof of the classical completeness theorem. It is based on the following C-counterparts of the well-known
classical results.
Lemma 4 (The C-deduction theorem). Let X be a set of closed formulas and let  and  be closed formulas such that
X, C . Then X C  ⊃ .
Lemma 5. Let X be a C-consistent theory and let  be a closed formula. If X  C , then X ∪ {¬} is C-consistent.
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Lemma 6. Let X be a C-consistent theory and let (x) be a formula such that X C ∃x(x). Then for some term t,
X  C ¬(t).
The proofs of the lemmas are a straightforward extension of the proof of the corresponding classical results and are
omitted.
Now we are almost ready for the proof of Theorem 5. We just need the following deﬁnition and lemma.
Deﬁnition 10. Atomic formulas and their negations are called literals. Formulas of the form ∃x(∧j Lj (x)), where
the Lj (x)s are literals are called basic.
Lemma 7 (Chang and Keisler [2, Excercise 1.5.7(iv), p. 59]). Over a monadic language, each formula is equivalent
to a propositional (boolean) combination of atomic and basic formulas.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let X be a C-consistent set of formulas over Lb. We shall prove that X has a term model.
Let ∃x0(x), ∃x1(x), . . . , ∃xi (x), . . . be a sequence of all basic formulas overL. 13 We shall construct a sequence
of sets of closed formulas Xi by induction as follows.
• X0 = X.
• IfXi C ∃xi (x), then by Lemma 6, for some constant c,Xi  C ¬i (c) and we letXi+1 beXi ∪{i (c)}. Otherwise,
Xi+1 = Xi ∪ {¬∃xi (x)}. By Lemmas 5 and 6, in both cases Xi+1 is C-consistent.
Let X′ =⋃∞i=0Xi . Then X′ is consistent (in the usual ﬁrst-order sense), because all Xi are consistent. In addition, it
immediately follows from the deﬁnition of X′ that it is complete with respect to the set of all basic formulas over L. 14
Let w be a maximal (with respect to inclusion) set of closed atomic formulas over Lb such that X′ ∪w is consistent
(in the usual ﬁrst-order sense).
In particular, w is a Herbrand b-interpretation. Since X ⊆ X′, the proof of the theorem will be completed if we
show that for each closed formula  ∈ FmLb , w  if and only if X′ ∪w . In fact, by Lemma 7, it sufﬁces to show
that the equivalence holds for closed atomic and basic formulas, because the case of their propositional combinations
follows from the maximality of w and the “basic” completeness of X′.
The case in which  is a closed atomic formula follows from the deﬁnition of satisﬁability by a Herbrand b-
interpretation.
Let  be of the form ∃x(L1(x) ∧ L2(x) ∧ · · · ∧ Ln(x)) for some literals L1(x), L2(x), . . . , Ln(x).
Assume that w . That is, for some c ∈ TLb , w L1(c) ∧ L2(c) ∧ · · · ∧ Ln(c). Thus, by maximality of w,
wL1(c) ∧ L2(c) ∧ · · · ∧ Ln(c), implying w  ∃x(L1(x) ∧ L2(x) ∧ · · · ∧ Ln(x)).
Conversely, assume X′ ∪w . Since X′ ∪w is consistent, X′  ¬∃x(L1(x)∧L2(x)∧ · · · ∧Ln(x)). Thus, by the
deﬁnition of X′, for some c ∈ TLb , L1(c) ∧ L2(c) ∧ · · · ∧ Ln(c) ∈ X′. By the deﬁnition of w, w L1(c) ∧ L2(c) ∧· · · ∧ Ln(c), and w  follows. 
5.3. Proof of Theorem 10
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 10 stating that for a uniterm default theory (D,A) there exists a
ﬁnite set of new constant symbols b′ such that for any inﬁnite set of new constant symbols b the following holds. There
is an extension E for (D¯Lb , A) if and only if there is an extension E′ for (D¯Lb′ , A) such that E ∩ FmL = E′ ∩ FmL.
The proof of the “if” part of Theorem is presented in Section 5.3.1 and the proof of its “only if” part is presented in
Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1. Proof of the “if” part of Theorem 10
The proof of the “if” part of Theorem 10 immediately follows from Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory, b be a set of new constant symbols, and let b′ be a non-empty subset
of b. Then for any extension E′ for (D¯Lb′ , A) there is an extension E for (D¯Lb , A) such that E ∩ FmL = E′ ∩ FmL.
13 Recall that L is countable.
14 That is, for each basic formula  over L, either X′  or X′ ¬.
252 M. Kaminski, J. Rubin-Mosin / Theoretical Computer Science 364 (2006) 241–253
The proof of Lemma 8 is based on the following proposition that will also be used in the proof of Lemma 9 in the
next section.
Proposition 1 (Cf. Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary et al. [1, Proposition 4]). Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory and let b be
a set of new constant symbols. Then E is an extension for (D¯Lb , A) if and only if for each new constant symbol c ∈ b
there is an extension Ec for (D¯L{c} , A) such that E = Th(
⋃
c∈bEc). 15
Proposition 1 immediately follows from [1, Proposition 4], if we treat the elements of FmL as propositional constants.
We leave the details to the reader.
Proof of Lemma 8. Let E′ be an extension for (D¯Lb′ , A). By Proposition 1, for each c ∈ b′ there is an extension
Ec for (D¯L{c} , A) such that E′ = Th(
⋃
c∈b′Ec). Let c′ be constant symbol from b′ that we ﬁx till the end of the
proof. For each c ∈ b \ b′ let Ec = {(c) : (c′) ∈ Ec′ }. That is, Ec results from Ec′ in replacing c′ with c in
all its formulas. Since Ec′ is an extension for (D¯L{c′} , A), E
c is an extension for (D¯L{c} , A), and, by Proposition 1,
E = Th(⋃c∈b′Ec ∪⋃c∈b\b′Ec) is an extension for (D¯Lb , A).
Obviously, E′ ⊆ E ∩ FmLb′ . Therefore, for the proof of Lemma 8 it sufﬁces to show that E ∩ FmLb′ ⊆ E′.
Let  ∈ E ∩ FmLb′ . That is, 
,1(c1),2(c2), . . . ,n(cn) , where 
 ⊂
⋃
c∈b′Ec and {1(c1),2(c2), . . . ,
n(cn)} ⊂
⋃
c∈b\b′Ec. 16
Since the i (x)s are formulas over L and the cis do not appear in the elements of 
 or in , replacing each ci ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, in the derivation of from
∪{1(c1),2(c2), . . . ,n(cn)} with c′, we obtain
,1(c′),2(c′), . . . ,
n(c
′) .
It follows from the deﬁnition of the Eci s that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i (c′) ∈ Ec′ , which together with 
 ⊂⋃
c∈b′Ec imply  ∈ E′. Thus, E ∩ FmLb′ ⊆ E′. 
5.3.2. Proof of the “only if” part of Theorem 10
We start with the deﬁnition of the similarity relation between constant symbols of b.
Deﬁnition 11. Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory, b be a set of new constant symbols, and let E be an extension
for (D¯Lb , A). We say that two constants c′, c′′ ∈ b are E-similar, denoted c′ ∼E c′′, if for any uniterm formula (x)
over L, (c′) ∈ E if and only if (c′′) ∈ E.
Obviously, ∼E is an equivalence relation on b and we ﬁx a subset bE of b that contains exactly one constant from
each class of similar constants.
Finally, we deﬁne a function  : b → bE by (c) = c′ if and only if c ∼E c′. That is,  picks up a representative
from each equivalence class of ∼E .
The proof of the “only if” part of Theorem 10 is based on Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Let (D,A) be a uniterm default theory, b be an inﬁnite set of new constant symbols, E be an extension for
(D¯Lb , A), and let b′ be a subset of b that includes bE . There is an extension E′ for (D¯Lb′ , A) such that E ∩ FmL =
E′ ∩ FmL.
Proof. By Proposition 1, for each c ∈ b there is an extension Ec for (D¯L{c} , A) such that E = Th(
⋃
c∈bEc).
Let E′ = Th(⋃c∈b′Ec). Then, by Proposition 1, E′ is an extension for (D¯Lb′ , A), and it remains to show that
E ∩ FmLb′ = E′. The inclusion E′ ⊆ E ∩ FmLb′ is obvious.
The proof of E ∩ FmLb′ ⊆ E′ is similar to that of the corresponding inclusion in the proof of Lemma 8.
Let  ∈ E ∩ FmLb′ . That is, 
,1(c1),2(c2), . . . ,n(cn) , where 
 ⊂
⋃
c∈b′Ec and {1(c1),2(c2), . . . ,
n(cn)} ⊂
⋃
c∈b\b′Ec.
15 Loosely speaking, Proposition 1 states that each extension for (D¯Lb , A) “splits” into extensions for (D¯L{c} , A), where c ∈ b.
16 Note that constant symbols c1, c2, . . . , cn may not be pairwise different.
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Since the i (x)s are formulas over L and the cis do not appear in the elements of 
 or in , replacing each ci in the
derivation of  from 
 ∪ {c1, c2, . . . , cn} with (ci), we obtain 
,1((c1)),2((c2)), . . . ,n((cn)) .
It follows from the deﬁnition of  that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,i ((ci)) ∈ E(ci ), which togetherwith
 ⊂
⋃
c∈b′ Ec
imply  ∈ E′. 
Proof of the “only if” part of Theorem 10. By the deﬁnition of a uniterm default theory (Deﬁnition 6), L is ﬁnite.
Thus, by Lemma 7, the number of non-equivalent uniterm formulas over L is ﬁnite, say, of cardinality k, implying that
there are at most 2k non-E-similar constants.
Since the intersections of extensions for (D¯Lb′ , A) with FmL depend only on the cardinality of b
′
, the “only if” part
of Theorem 10 follows from Lemma 9 with b′ of cardinality 2k or greater. 
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